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INTRODUCTION
On August 5th, 2017, while enjoying the thrills and frills of a Six Flags
theme park, Hugo and Sharon Soto used their debit cards to purchase food
ﬁve separate times during their outing.1 After processing each payment for
their food purchases, Six Flags issued them a receipt that contained all twelve
digits of their debit card number.2 The Sotos sued in state court on behalf of
themselves and a putative class arguing that these receipts violated the federal
Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), amended by the Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act (FACTA), which prohibits the printing of more than the
last ﬁve digits of a credit or debit card number on an electronically printed
receipt.3 The Sotos argued that their injury consisted of the chance that the
receipts that they had thrown away could compromise their payment card
information; however, they did not allege that their credit or debit card
information had actually been compromised.4
After the Sotos filed their complaint in state court, the defendants
removed the case to federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction
and the Class Action Fairness Act.5 Even though the statute created a federal
cause of action and Six Flags’ action arguably violated congressional directive,
the federal district court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear
the claim.6 The court reasoned that a recent Supreme Court holding in Spokeo,
Inc. v. Robins7 controlled and determined that the plaintiﬀs did not satisfy
Spokeo’s legal test for establishing Article III standing.8 The plaintiﬀs simply
failed to allege a suﬃciently concrete injury.9 However, the court’s ﬁnding
regarding the Sotos’ ability to establish federal standing did not put an end
to the Sotos’ attempt to vindicate their statutory rights. Instead, the court
remanded the case to Illinois state court to determine whether the state court
had jurisdiction to entertain the suit.10
How could the Sotos, and the class, lack standing to pursue their federal
cause of action in federal court but potentially be able to assert their claim
in state court? As the district court described, “Illinois is not bound to follow

Soto v. Great Am. LLC, No. 17-6902, 2018 WL 2364916, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 24, 2018).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2-5.
578 U.S. 330, 334 (2016) [hereinafter Spokeo]. In this case, the Supreme Court held that
“[Plaintiﬀs cannot] allege a bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete harm, and satisfy
the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III.” Id. at 341.
8 Soto, 2018 WL 2364916, at *2-3.
9 Id.
10 Id. at *4-5.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
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Article III’s requirements in the same way that federal courts are.”11 The
court noted that the Supreme Court’s standing jurisprudence had created a
notable twist in the system: “Although this means that a state court
potentially has jurisdiction over a federal statutory violation in an instance
where a federal court does not, this is in fact a notable quirk of the United
States federalist system.”12
University of Missouri law professor Thomas Bennett recently analyzed
this aspect of our judicial system: there are some state courts, speciﬁcally
those that have a standing doctrine distinct from federal courts, that can exert
exclusive jurisdiction over federal question claims.13 However, he is skeptical
that this feature of our judicial system is a “quirk” as much as it “produce[s]
an outcome at best bizarre and at worst harmful to the integrity of federal
law.”14 He argues that “the more signiﬁcant reason to be wary of Spokeo and
its progeny is that they work a massive transfer of federal claims from federal
to state courts, where federal law will develop largely without the
participation of federal courts.”15 While he sees potential costs to plaintiﬀs
and defendants, the biggest consequence, in his view, is “the possibility of
disuniformity in federal law.”16 His solution to this perceived problem is for
the Supreme Court to overturn its decision restricting standing in Spokeo.17
The Supreme Court ultimately declined that path; instead, it reaﬃrmed
Spokeo’s core holding ﬁve years later in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez—another
case involving the FCRA.18 The majority came to its decision despite the
dissent’s warning that “[b]y declaring that federal courts lack jurisdiction, the
Court has thus ensured that state courts will exercise exclusive jurisdiction
over these sorts of class actions.”19
In this Essay, I argue that Bennett’s predictions concerning the eﬀects of
the Supreme Court’s recent opinions on the standing doctrine and his
criticisms of this dimension of judicial federalism are overstated. The data on
Id. at *4 (relying on ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989)).
Id. at *5 (quoting Miranda v. Magic Mountain LLC, 2018 WL 571914, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan.
25, 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
13 Thomas B. Bennett, The Paradox of Exclusive State-Court Jurisdiction Over Federal Claims, 105
MINN. L. REV. 1211, 1212 (2021) [hereinafter Bennett, Paradox]. I will note that my use of the phrase
“exclusive jurisdiction” in this sentence, and in other places in this Essay, is a little imprecise as the
United States Supreme Court may still exercise appellate jurisdiction over the federal question
claim—at least where the defendant has lost at the state supreme court level. See infra Part III.
However, for purposes of above-the-line brevity and coherence, please accept this footnote disclaimer.
14 Id. at 1213.
15 Id. at 1214.
16 Id. at 1216. Bennett’s other concerns regarding the alleged costs to plaintiﬀs and defendants
are not addressed in this Essay.
17 Id. at 1215.
18 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2204-07 (2021) [hereinafter TransUnion].
19 Id. at 2224 n.9 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
11
12
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the initial impact of Spokeo and TransUnion do not paint as stark a “massive
transfer” of cases as Bennett suggests. State courts that have jurisdiction to
entertain these cases are well suited to adjudicate federal questions, will not
create substantial disuniformity in federal law, and will not usurp the federal
sovereign’s power to create and interpret federal law. As such, the potential
of exclusive state-court jurisdiction over federal question claims is a feature
and not a bug of the Constitution’s design, or at least the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of it. This Essay proceeds in three Parts. First, I give
background on the development of the federal standing doctrine. In the
process, I brieﬂy describe how standing in state and federal courts may diﬀer,
which results in some state courts entertaining federal question claims that
federal courts cannot exert jurisdiction over. Second, I detail Bennett’s
argument that this enterprise is a bug and not a feature of our judicial system.
Third, I argue that his fears of disuniformity of federal law and usurpation of
the federal sovereign’s power to create and interpret federal law are
misguided. I report initial data from state courts entertaining these types of
cases, which demonstrate that there has not been a mass transfer of federal
question cases from federal courts to state courts. Further, Bennett’s
criticisms fall ﬂat given evidence of state and federal court parity adjudicating
federal questions, and the Supreme Court’s retention of the power to review
state-court judgments, at least when the defendant has lost below.20
I. FEDERAL COURT STANDING AND FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION
This Part traces the interaction between the Supreme Court’s standing
and federal question jurisdiction doctrines which lay the foundation for the
situation in which our judicially federalized system now ﬁnds itself: some
state courts exercising exclusive jurisdiction over federal question claims.
A. Federal Court Standing: Doctrinal Developments from Lujan to TransUnion
The standing doctrine serves a gatekeeping function for the federal courts
and “identif[ies] those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the
judicial process.”21 This Essay focuses on what injuries suﬃce to confer
standing as it is the “core of Article III’s requirement for cases and

20 The Supreme Court is empowered to review judgments, not opinions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a)
(“Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be
had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court . . . .”).
21 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495
U.S. 149, 155 (1990)). For an extensive overview of the robust scholarship analyzing the rise of the
federal standing doctrine and arguing that modern judges—not the founders—invented the standing
doctrine, see Bennett, Paradox, supra note 13, at 1217 n.23, 1219 nn.28-30.
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controversies.”22 The Supreme Court has generally restricted access to federal
courts through tightening what qualiﬁes as an injury in fact.23
Justice Scalia succinctly articulated the modern standing doctrine in Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife.24 In Lujan, the plaintiﬀs challenged a rule that the
Secretary of the Interior promulgated which interpreted the Endangered
Species Act.25 The plaintiffs relied on a citizen-suit section of the Act that read
“any person may commence a civil suit . . . to enjoin . . . any . . . agency . . .
alleged to be in violation of any provision” of the Act.26 The Court addressed
the question: can Congress statutorily grant a plaintiff standing solely
through creating a cause of action, i.e., did the plaintiffs have standing under
Article III to sue?27 The Court found that the plaintiffs did not have standing
to sue in federal court,28 and in effect, the Court held that even though a
plaintiff may have a statutory right to sue, such plaintiff is not guaranteed
Article III standing.29
Justice Scalia, speaking for the Court, argued that for a plaintiﬀ in federal
court to satisfy the “Cases and Controversies” requirement of Article III,30
she must (1) have suffered an “injury in fact” (2) that is “fairly traceable” to the
defendant’s conduct—that the defendant caused the injury—(3) which a
court can remedy.31 The Court emphasized that the “injury in fact” must be
(1) concrete and particularized and (2) actual or imminent—not conjectural or
hypothetical.32 Because the Court stated that the necessary harm needed to
be “concrete and particularized” to confer standing, it created a disjunctive
test, implying that a harm could be concrete but not particularized, or, on the
other hand, particularized but not concrete.33
Even though it described the disjunctive test, the Court held that the
plaintiﬀs failed to allege an actual or imminent harm, and the novel theories
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 64 (3d ed. 2006).
See Bennett, Paradox, supra note 13, at 1218 (“[A] series of slow but steady changes to standing
doctrine have conspired, over the last ﬁfty years, to restrict access to federal courts. Almost all of
the doctrinal changes to this requirement involve the ‘injury’ prong of that three-part test for
standing.” (footnotes omitted)).
24 504 U.S. at 560-61.
25 Id. at 557-58.
26 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A).
27 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 558; Bennett, Paradox, supra note 13, at 1221.
28 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578.
29 Bennett, Paradox, supra note 13, at 1223-24.
30 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
31 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
32 Id. at 560 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
33 Bennett, Paradox, supra note 13, at 1223 (“By setting the requirements of concreteness and
particularization apart, Lujan’s formulation thus subtly expanded the doctrinal test for standing. By
enumerating these sub-elements conjunctively, Lujan suggested that they have diﬀerent content and
must be satisﬁed separately.”).
22
23
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of standing the plaintiﬀs alleged failed to establish a particularized harm.34 A
particularized harm is one that “is more acute than [that suﬀered by] the
public at large,” and the plaintiﬀs in Lujan failed to demonstrate that their
injuries were unique to them.35 The Court said little, however, about whether
the harms the plaintiﬀs alleged were suﬃciently concrete.36 It left the
question, and analysis, of what harms are concrete enough to confer Article
III standing unanswered for over two decades.
The Court took up that question and ﬂeshed out the standing doctrine
when it agreed to hear arguments in Spokeo and TransUnion, both of which
involved the FCRA.37 The FCRA regulates agencies that compile and
disseminate consumers’ personal information, aiming to protect consumer
privacy and promote fair and accurate credit reporting.38 To enforce these
provisions, the FCRA “creates a private cause of action, imposes statutory
damages of up to $1,000 for each willful violation of the act, and authorizes
awards of punitive damages and attorney’s fees to successful plaintiﬀs.”39
The Court’s ﬁrst cut at deﬁning the contours of the concreteness
requirement came in Spokeo.40 The case involved Spokeo, a ﬁrm that operates
a “people search engine.”41 Spokeo ran a search on the plaintiﬀ, Thomas
Robins, which returned inaccurate information.42 Robins ﬁled a class-action
complaint alleging, among other things, violations of the FCRA.43 Spokeo
moved to dismiss the case for lack of standing and argued that Robins failed
to plead a concrete injury.44
Justice Alito, speaking for the majority, ruled narrowly on the issue
presented, while reasoning loudly about the concreteness requirement. First,
the Court emphasized the conjunctive nature of the injury requirement—a
plaintiﬀ ’s injury must be particularized and concrete.45 He wrote that
“[p]articularization is necessary to establish injury in fact, but it is not
suﬃcient. An injury in fact must also be ‘concrete.’”46 Second, the Court
articulated a concreteness standard. A concrete harm must be de facto—it
must actually exist; further, “[w]hen [the Court has] used the adjective
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564, 567.
Bennett, Paradox, supra note 13, at 1220.
Id. at 1224.
Spokeo, 578 U.S. 330, 333 (2016); TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2202 (2021).
15 U.S.C. § 1681(a); TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2200.
Bennett, Paradox, supra note 13, at 1225; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A), (a)(2), (c).
578 U.S. 330 (2016).
Id. at 333.
Id.
Id. at 336.
Id. at 336-37.
Id. at 339-43.
Id. at 339.
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‘concrete,’ [it has] meant to convey the usual meaning of the term—‘real,’ and
not ‘abstract.’”47 Third, the Court emphasized that a concrete harm need not
necessarily be tangible. In fact, the Court had recognized intangible, concrete
harms in other cases.48 To determine whether or not an intangible harm
satisﬁes the concreteness requirement, Justice Alito instructed one to look to
history and the judgment of Congress.49 But, fourth, Congress cannot create
a cognizable harm out of thin air. In the Court’s view,
Congress’ role in identifying and elevating intangible harms does not mean
that a plaintiﬀ automatically satisﬁes the injury-in-fact requirement
whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize
that person to sue to vindicate that right. Article III standing requires a
concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation. For that reason,
Robins could not, for example, allege a bare procedural violation, divorced from
any concrete harm, and satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III.50

Therefore, Congress cannot legislatively specify, create, or designate harms
as concrete for Article III purposes. However, on the record before it, the
Court could not decide if Robins experienced a concrete harm and did not
discuss exactly what role Congress had in its power to identify or elevate
intangible harms.51 The Court decided to vacate the Ninth Circuit’s decision
and remand for further analysis.52
The Court answered these outstanding questions and rounded out its
standing-doctrine jurisprudence and analysis of concrete harms in TransUnion.53
A putative class of over eight-thousand people sued TransUnion for an alleged
failure to use reasonable procedures to ensure accuracy of their credit ﬁles in
violation of the FCRA.54 There were essentially two groups of claimants—
those who had a misleading and erroneous ﬁle given to a third party and those
who did not.55 The Court held that those who had their ﬁles disseminated to
third parties did allege a particularized and concrete injury. Yet, those whose
alleged harm was having erroneous information on file that was not given to a
third party did not sustain the requisite injury needed to establish standing in

47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

Id. at 340.
Id.
Id. at 340-41.
Id. at 341.
Id. at 342-43.
Id. at 343; Bennett, Paradox, supra note 13, at 1227.
141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021).
Id. at 2200.
Id.
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federal courts.56 The Court held this even though the statute explicitly created
substantive privacy rights and authorized both types of plaintiffs to sue.57
The Court emphasized that the central role in determining concreteness
is whether the alleged harm has a “close relationship” to a harm traditionally
recognized by American courts, “such as physical harm, monetary harm, or
various intangible harms including . . . reputational harm.”58 The Court
stated that “[the] inquiry asks whether plaintiﬀs have identiﬁed a close
historical or common-law analogue for their asserted injury.”59 In a lengthy
passage, Justice Kavanaugh, writing for the majority, then analyzed
Congress’s role in conferring standing by creating certain rights. He wrote:
In determining whether a harm is suﬃciently concrete to qualify as an injury
in fact, the Court in Spokeo said that Congress’s views may be “instructive.”
Courts must aﬀord due respect to Congress’s decision to impose a statutory
prohibition or obligation on a defendant, and to grant a plaintiﬀ a cause of
action to sue over the defendant’s violation of that statutory prohibition or
obligation. In that way, Congress may “elevate to the status of legally
cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate
in law.” But even though “Congress may ‘elevate’ harms that ‘exist’ in the real
world before Congress recognized them to actionable legal status, it may not
simply enact an injury into existence, using its lawmaking power to transform
something that is not remotely harmful into something that is.”
Importantly, this Court has rejected the proposition that “a plaintiﬀ
automatically satisﬁes the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute
grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to
vindicate that right.” As the Court emphasized in Spokeo, “Article III standing
requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation.”60

Consequently, a plaintiﬀ may have a federal statutory cause of action to
sue a defendant for allegedly violating a federal law, without experiencing any
concrete harm caused by the defendant’s conduct.61 In essence, “under Article
III, an injury in law is not an injury in fact.”62 The Court justiﬁed this analysis
by arguing that such a distinction was essential to the Constitution’s
separation of powers.63
Id.
Erwin Chemerinsky, What’s Standing After TransUnion, LLC v. Ramirez, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV.
ONLINE 269, 280 (2021).
58 TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2200.
59 Id. at 2204.
60 Id. at 2204-05 (citations omitted).
61 Id. at 2205.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 2207; see also id. at 2206 (“[I]f the law of Article III did not require plaintiﬀs to
demonstrate a ‘concrete harm,’ Congress could authorize virtually any citizen to bring a statutory
56
57
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However, the dissenters were not persuaded. Justice Thomas’s dissent
pointedly argued that “[n]ever before has this Court declared that legal injury
is inherently insuﬃcient to support standing. And never before has this Court
declared that legislatures are constitutionally precluded from creating legal
rights enforceable in federal court if those rights deviate too far from their
common-law roots.”64 Justice Kagan echoed this concern in her dissent as
well. She wrote, “[t]he Court here transforms standing law from a doctrine
of judicial modesty into a tool of judicial aggrandizement. It holds, for the
ﬁrst time, that a speciﬁc class of plaintiﬀs whom Congress allowed to bring a
lawsuit cannot do so under Article III.”65
*

*

*

This brief discussion of the trio of standing cases brings to light three
important points. First, the Court’s analysis of the particularization prong
focuses on the characteristics of the plaintiﬀ—that they felt the injury
personally and individually.66 Second, a concrete harm inquiry asks, instead,
“whether the plaintiﬀ ’s injury is suﬃciently tangible, even assuming it is
particular to her.”67 As such, the concreteness prong focuses on the
characteristics of the injury itself. If a court considers one category of injuries
to be non-concrete, no one can sue in federal court to redress it.68 Third, and
most importantly for purposes of this Essay, these cases apply to standing in
federal courts, where Article III constrains jurisdiction. They do not necessarily
apply in state courts—an issue to which this Essay now turns.
B. Standing in State Courts
As discussed above, Lujan, Spokeo, and TransUnion illustrate a standing
doctrine that ﬁnds its grounding in the “Cases and Controversies” clause of
the United States Constitution.69 Those constraints, including the particularity
damages suit against virtually any defendant who violated virtually any federal law. Such an
expansive understanding of Article III would ﬂout constitutional text, history, and precedent.”).
While not the focus of this Essay, one may wonder, instead, whether this ruling is a further extension
of the Court’s contempt for Congress. See generally Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword, Democracy and
Disdain, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2012).
64 Id. at 2221 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
65 Id. at 2225 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
66 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 567 (1992) (“It goes beyond the limit,
however, and into pure speculation and fantasy, to say that anyone who observes or works with an
endangered species, anywhere in the world, is appreciably harmed by a single project aﬀecting some
portion of that species with which he has no more speciﬁc connection.”).
67 See Bennett, Paradox, supra note 13, at 1220.
68 Id.
69 See supra Section I.A.
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and concreteness requirements, do not bind state courts.70 State courts are free
to determine standing in their jurisdiction.71 Some have followed the Supreme
Court’s articulation of the doctrine.72 However, others have opted to develop
their own doctrine without certain requirements imposed by federal courts.73
State courts often deﬁne their standing doctrine in reaction to federal
developments.74 Bennett observed that “[s]tate courts’ varied reception to
70 ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (“[T]he state judiciary here chose a
diﬀerent path, as was their right, and took no account of federal standing rules in letting the case go
to ﬁnal judgment in the [state] courts. That result properly follows from the allocation of authority
in the federal system. We have recognized often that the constraints of Article III do not apply to
state courts, and accordingly the state courts are not bound by the limitations of a case or controversy
or other federal rules of justiciability even when they address issues of federal law, as when they are
called upon to interpret the Constitution or, in this case, a federal statute.”).
71 Id.
72 Delaware, Georgia, and Missouri are among the states that follow the federal standing
doctrine. See, e.g., Dover Hist. Soc’y v. City of Dover Plan. Comm’n, 838 A.2d 1103, 1111 (Del.
2003) (“This Court has recognized that the Lujan requirements for establishing standing under
Article III to bring an action in federal court are generally the same as the standards for
determining standing to bring a case or controversy within the courts of Delaware.”); Sons of
Confederate Veterans v. Newton Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 861 S.E.2d 653, 657-58 (Ga. App. 2021)
(“And under federal and Georgia law, standing requires (1) an injury in fact; (2) a causal connection
between the injury and the causal conduct; and (3) the likelihood that the injury will be redressed
with a favorable decision. An injury in fact is one that is both concrete and particularized and
actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” (footnote and internal quotation marks
omitted)); Corozzo v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 531 S.W.3d 566, 573-74 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017) (“‘The
requirement that a party have standing to bring an action is a component of the general
requirement of justiciability’ in both the federal context and in Missouri.” (quoting Harrison v.
Monroe County, 716 S.W.2d 263, 265 (Mo. 1986) (en banc))).
73 Colorado, Illinois, and Iowa are among the states that have paved a distinct standing doctrine
path. See, e.g., Rocky Mountain Gun Owners v. Polis, No. 20CA0997, 2021 WL 5227247, at *8 (Colo.
App. Nov. 10, 2021) (“Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, on which the Governor relies, doesn’t require a contrary
conclusion. In that case, the Court held that a ‘bare procedural violation’ of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act would not be suﬃciently ‘concrete’ to confer standing on the plaintiﬀ. But that case
was decided based on Article III federal standing concepts, which are of limited utility in considering
standing under Colorado law. . . . [O]ur cases ‘reﬂect a more expansive view of standing under
Colorado law than that expressed under federal law.’” (citations omitted)); Soto v. Great Am. LLC,
165 N.E.3d 935, 941-42 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020) (“Accordingly, Illinois courts may interpret the federal
standing criteria less restrictively than federal courts do. . . . Guided by the above principles and
FACTA’s plain language, we hold that plaintiﬀs had standing to pursue their statutory claims
without pleading an actual injury beyond the violation of their statutory rights.”); Kline v.
SouthGate Prop. Mgmt., LLC, 895 N.W.2d 429, 437 n.4 (Iowa 2017) (“We are not persuaded that
the Article III limit on Congress’s power to authorize private litigation in the federal courts
identiﬁed in Spokeo applies to the same extent when the general assembly authorizes private
litigation in Iowa courts.”).
74 See Bennett, Paradox, supra note 13, at 1232 (“Regardless of their impetus or motivation for
doing so, state courts react to federal standing cases so that the doctrinal lines drawn in federal cases
become inscribed in state law—either aﬃrmatively or negatively.”); see also Wyatt Sassman, A Survey
of Constitutional Standing in State Courts, 8 KY. J. EQUINE AGRIC. & NAT’L RES. L. 349, 398 (2015)
(“Nevertheless, development of constitutional standing requirements in federal courts undoubtedly
prompted state courts to take up the issue and develop approaches following the path blazed by
federal decisions.”).
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Lujan’s revised standing doctrine led to a kaleidoscope of state standing
rules.”75 Bennett, building on the impressive work of Wyatt Sassman,
categorized state standing rules into camps that either adopted or rejected
Lujan’s framework.76 In his count, roughly half of states have adopted Lujan’s
framework, while the others have charted a diﬀerent course.77 But given the
reactionary nature of how state courts address standing in their own tribunals,
it is unsettled whether those states that have adopted or rejected Lujan will
continue those trends in light of Spokeo and TransUnion.78 Recent case law,
though, suggests that some states have rejected Spokeo and will entertain
federal questions in state courts that would not survive in federal courts.79
C. State Courts’ Duty to Entertain Federal Question Claims
The standing doctrine, derived from Article III, is not the only restriction
on federal court jurisdiction. Federal courts have limited jurisdiction and may
only entertain “such cases as are within the judicial power of the United States
as deﬁned in the Constitution and entrusted to them by a jurisdictional grant
by Congress.”80 The Constitution’s grant of judicial power for federal courts
extends to “all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made . . . under their authority.”81
Congress has implemented the Constitution’s grant of authority by passing
28 U.S.C. § 1331 with almost identical language.82 The statute allows federal
courts to adjudicate federal questions.83 Further, a number of federal statutes,
like the FCRA, contain their own jurisdictional provision authorizing suit in
federal court.84 Therefore, “true federal question jurisdiction is accomplished
by § 1331 and many jurisdictional provisions in other pieces of legislation.”85
See Bennett, Paradox, supra note 13, at 1232.
Id. at 1233 ﬁg.1. While Bennett also categorizes the standing rules against a prudential–
constitutional dimension, that perspective is not the focus of this article. Id.
77 Id. at 1233.
78 See id. (“But for many reasons—including change in court composition, a general lack of
standing cases in state courts, and the politicization of standing as a legal issue—a state’s adherence
to Lujan is no guarantee that Spokeo-type claims will be barred there. . . . Instead, Spokeo gives state
courts a new chance to decide whether to follow federal doctrine. Just as with Lujan, we should
expect states to make diﬀerent choices—and indeed they already are.”).
79 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 73.
80 Lawrence H. Cooke, Waste Not, Wait Not—A Consideration of Federal and State Jurisdiction, 49
FORDHAM L. REV. 895, 897 (1981).
81 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
82 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”).
83 John F. Preis, Reassessing the Purposes of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 42 W AKE F OREST
L. REV. 247, 250 (2007) [hereinafter Preis, Reassessing the Purposes].
84 E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1681p.
85 Preis, Reassessing the Purposes, supra note 83, at 251.
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Absent speciﬁc circumstances, state courts are obliged to open their doors
to federal questions and have done so historically.86 Supreme Court case law
coupled with constitutional scriptures make this so. First, the Constitution’s
Supremacy Clause commands that “[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby . . . .”87 Thus, the Constitution commands state-court judges to
enforce federal law.88 Second, scholars point to the “Madisonian Compromise”
etched into the ﬁrst clause of the Constitution’s third article.89 Succinctly put,
because the Constitution does not require Congress to create inferior federal
courts, state courts would be the de facto tribunal to adjudicate federal rights
if Congress decided not to create lower federal courts.90 Finally, the Supreme
Court has spoken authoritatively on the issue. In Claflin v. Houseman,91 the
Supreme Court held that state courts are presumed competent to adjudicate
federal claims and that there is a default presumption of concurrent
jurisdiction—that state courts and federal courts have jurisdiction over
federal questions unless Congress says otherwise.92 In the words of Redish
and Sklaver, Testa v. Katt93 held that “the Supremacy Clause required the
state courts to obey a valid federal law which obligated them to adjudicate
federal claims.”94 The Court framed the question as “concern[ing] only the
86 Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 389-91 (1947); Nicole A. Gordon & Douglas Gross, Justiciability
of Federal Claims in State Court, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1145, 1152-53 (1984); Paul J. Katz,
Comment, Standing in Good Stead: State Courts, Federal Standing Doctrine, and Reverse-Erie Analysis,
99 NW. U. L. REV. 1315, 1323-24 (2005).
87 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
88 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 907 (1997) (explaining that the Supremacy Clause
instructs state judges to enforce federal law); Katz, supra note 86, at 1322 (“When state judges
exercise . . . jurisdiction over federal claims, the Supremacy Clause directs them to uphold the
federal law over contrary state law.”).
89 U.S. CONST. art III, § 1, cl. 1. See generally Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court
Duties, and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 39; Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of
Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953).
90 Collins, supra note 89, at 47-49; Hart, supra note 89, at 1363-64.
91 93 U.S. 130 (1876).
92 Id. at 136-37; see also Martin H. Redish & John E. Muench, Adjudication of Federal Causes of
Action in State Court, 76 MICH. L. REV. 311, 314 (1976) (“[I]t must have been clearly understood at
the time [of the Founding] that state courts would be competent to hear federal causes of action,
since there was a possibility that no extensive federal judiciary would be formed.”); Gordon & Gross,
supra note 86, at 1160.
93 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
94 Martin H. Redish & Steven G. Sklaver, Federal Power to Commandeer State Courts:
Implications for the Theory of Judicial Federalism, 32 IND. L. REV. 71, 76 (1998); Testa, 330 U.S. at 38992, 393 (“For the policy of the federal Act is the prevailing policy in every state.”); see also Gordon
& Gross, supra note 86, at 1159-60 (“[Testa] ﬁnds a state court obligation to hear federal claims that
overcomes any policy of judicial restraint against hearing those claims, and it forbids discrimination
by the states against federal claims when the state courts can hear analogous state claims.”).
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right of a state to deny enforcement to claims growing out of a valid federal
law.”95 And it answered it in the negative—the state could not refuse to
adjudicate such claims.96 Therefore, the Court’s jurisprudence has created an
obligation for state courts to hear federal question claims unless either
Congress has excluded them from doing so or they have a valid excuse for
refusing their jurisdiction.97
*

*

*

This Part highlighted the design of our constitutional system that allows
for state courts to entertain claims emanating from federal law. Federal
standing restrictions do not bar state courts from entertaining claims in their
forum. And the Founders, the Constitution, and Supreme Court precedent
presume that state courts are competent to hear claims arising out of federal
law. Therefore, the fact that some federal question claims are adjudicated in
state courts when they are barred from federal court is less of a bug in the
system as much as it is a predictable feature of judicial federalism.98
II. CRITICISMS OF THE POST-SPOKEO AND TRANSUNION LANDSCAPE
This aspect of our judicial system—the potential of exclusive state-court
jurisdiction over federal claims—troubles Professor Bennett. While his
critique is largely of this development of federal standing doctrine,99 he
articulates a fear that this design threatens federal law. He argues that “[t]he
potential costs to the federal judiciary and its ability to superintend the
development of federal law are grave.”100 He predicts “a massive transfer of
federal claims from federal to state courts, where federal law will develop
largely without the participation of federal courts.”101 The foremost issue to
Testa, 300 U.S. at 394.
Id.; cf. Taﬄin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 460 (1990) (ﬁnding that state courts have presumptive
authority to adjudicate federal claims); sources cited infra note 97.
97 Gordon & Gross, supra note 86 at 1165 (explaining that Testa has come to stand for “the
proposition that state courts of general jurisdiction must hear all properly-presented federal claims
when jurisdiction is concurrent”). In the rare event that there is a “disabling incompatibility between
the federal claim and state court adjudication,” Testa and its progeny provide an escape hatch from
a state court’s obligation to hear federal claims. Id. at 1153 (quoting Gulf Oﬀshore Co. v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 477-78 (1981)); see also id. at 1153 n.25 (collecting authority describing the
exceptions to this obligation).
98 For a brief discussion of the themes inherent in judicial federalism, see Michael E. Solimine,
Supreme Court Monitoring of State Courts in the Twenty-First Century, 35 IND. L. REV. 335, 335 (2002)
and Sandra Day O’ Connor, Our Judicial Federalism, 35 CASE W. L. REV. 1 (1984).
99 I do not necessarily disagree with him, and the army of others, who have persuasively
critiqued and questioned the Supreme Court’s standing doctrine.
100 Bennett, Paradox, supra note 13, at 1244.
101 Id. at 1214.
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him is the “possibility of disuniformity in federal law, a problem the Supreme
Court alone cannot solve. If the guiding principle for claim allocation in the
federal system is that federal law should be mainly decided by federal
courts . . ., the present state of aﬀairs ﬂips that presumption on its head.”102
Finally, he argues that the fallout from the Court’s standing decisions was
“unforeseen,” and that the only way out of this “paradox” is for the Court to
overrule Spokeo.103
III. A FEATURE AND NOT A BUG
Bennett’s criticisms are misplaced and overstate the effects that Spokeo
and TransUnion may have on the state and federal judicial system. The initial
data from the post-Spokeo world does not indicate a massive transfer of cases.
Rather, the data show that the Supreme Court cases affected a limited
number of federal statutes, and even then, plaintiffs have not inundated state
courts. Further, state courts that entertain these federal question cases are
(1) well-suited to adjudicate federal questions, (2) will not create substantial
disuniformity in federal law, and (3) do not warrant critiques stemming from
federalism concerns—namely, that federal law should be created and
interpreted solely by the federal sovereign. The Framers might not have
envisioned this exact situation, but constitutional insight may help
understand the situation not as a “paradox” but as a feature of federalism.104
First, an analysis of cases citing Spokeo and TransUnion support an initial
conclusion that there has not been a massive transfer of federal cases to state
court. Out of the 5,565 cases that cite Spokeo, which the Court decided in
2016, only fifty-three, or 0.95%, are state-court decisions.105 However, out of
these fifty-three cases, only six involve plaintiffs bringing federal statutory
causes of action.106 And these cases only entertained certain federal claims—
Id. at 1216.
Id. at 1244, 1267-68.
Chief Justice Burger once observed in reference to an ALI study that “[u]narticulated, but
implicit, in the Institute’s study was that the state courts of this country are the basic instrument
of justice under our system, and this, of course, is the heart of what we call federalism.” Cooke,
supra note 80, at 898.
105 To conduct this search, I retrieved Spokeo on Westlaw and narrowed its citing references to
cases. I excluded cases that came from the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, Washington
D.C. Superior Court system, “Specialty” Courts, or courts from the Territories when deriving the
total number of decisions that cite Spokeo (5,565). To ﬁnd the number of state-court decisions, I then
ﬁltered by jurisdiction to “State.” Following the same method, TransUnion has been cited in 432
cases since the Supreme Court announced its decision. Only three have been state-court decisions.
These searches were run on April 6, 2022.
106 See Soto v. Great Am. LLC, 165 N.E.3d 935, 942 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020) (finding standing for
the plaintiff to assert their FACTA claim); Lee v. Buth-Na-Bodhaige, Inc., 143 N.E.3d 645, 665
(Ill. App. Ct. 2019) (holding that the state court properly exerted jurisdiction over the plaintiff ’s
102
103
104
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not an avalanche of the entire United States Code. These claims were based
on the FCRA and FACTA, and in two cases, the plaintiﬀs’ claims were
dismissed for lack of standing.107 Spokeo’s true impact may not be fully felt
until the dust settles from the TransUnion opinion. But there have only been
three cases decided by state courts that cite TransUnion—and in each case, the
plaintiffs brought a state-law cause of action.108 Five years after Spokeo,
though, there has been a slight, arguably negligible, transfer of cases from
federal to state courts, based on a narrow set of federal statutes.109
Second, state courts are equipped to decide federal question cases and are
not likely to create disuniformity with federal law. As discussed above, state
courts of general jurisdiction are presumed competent to hear claims based
on federal law.110 They regularly entertain and adjudicate signiﬁcant federal
questions predicated on the Constitution—speciﬁcally the Bill of Rights and
the Fourteenth Amendment.111 This is likely due to state-courts’ handling of
criminal and habeas dockets, which present rights-based claims that may have

FACTA claim); Smith v. Ohio State Univ., No. 17AP-218, 2017 WL 6016627, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec.
5, 2017) (dismissing the plaintiff ’s FCRA claims for lack of standing); Corozzo v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 531 S.W.3d. 566, 575-76 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017) (finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring
their FCRA claim); Campbell v. Adecco USA, Inc., 561 S.W.3d 116, 124 (Mo. Ct. App. 2018) (finding
that the plaintiffs lacked standing as to one of their claims under the FCRA, but that they established
a concrete injury to support standing for two of their other claims); Courtright v. O’Reilly Auto., 604
S.W.3d 694, 704 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020) (finding standing for the plaintiff to assert his FCRA claim).
107 See cases cited supra note 106. But see Chemerinsky, supra note 57, at 284 (“The implications
of TransUnion apply to a myriad of federal statutes.”). While this Essay does not attempt to evaluate
Dean Chemerinsky’s concerns, they do not seem warranted either based on this initial assessment.
108 Laws v. Grayeyes, 498 P.3d 410 (Utah 2021); State ex rel. W. Va. Univ. Hosps.-E., Inc. v.
Hammer, 866 S.E.2d 187 (W. Va. 2021); Dohlen v. City of San Antonio, No. 20-025, 2022 WL 983764
(Tex. Apr. 1, 2022).
109 This analysis is arguably incomplete. There are other ways to investigate the potential
transfer of cases. For example, one could search for cases citing various federal laws or their
subsections, including the FACTA, FCRA, Telephone Consumer Protection Act, etc. However, the
results are fairly similar. As of April 6, 2022, on Westlaw, only 62 of the 2,931 cases citing the ﬁrst
provision of the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681—which courts often cite when adjudicating FCRA
claims—after May 16, 2016, the day the Supreme Court decided Spokeo, are from state courts.
However, the percent of state-court decisions, 2.11%, overstates potential state-court involvement
because many involve decisions that are not about the merits of a plaintiﬀ ’s claim. See, e.g., Shasteen
v. ABC Phones of N.C., Inc., No. 685 WDA 2020, 2021 WL 4704156, at *2 (Pa. Super. Ct. Oct 8,
2021) (aﬃrming arbitration panel’s decision on the basis that a court may not retry issues addressed
in arbitration); Richardson v. Murray, No. 120,680, 2020 WL 4723097, at *1 (Kan. Ct. App. Aug. 14,
2020) (aﬃrming the district court’s award of attorney’s fees for a breach of contract claim and its
denial of attorney’s fees under the Kansas Consumer Protection Act); Alston v. Schuckit & Assocs.,
P.C., No. 3048, 2020 WL 3639868, at *4 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. July 6, 2020) (ﬁnding that the lower
court “did not abuse its discretion in denying [the appellant’s] motion and dismissing his case with
prejudice”). My goal with these empirical observations is not to be exhaustive but to begin the
conversation on how to measure the impact of Spokeo and TransUnion on our judicial system.
110 See supra Section I.C.
111 See, e.g., Preis, Reassessing the Purposes, supra note 83, at 283.
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analogous state constitution provisions.112 State courts have more limited
experience handling claims based on federal statutes.113 While state courts
may initially lack experience in these matters,114 it is something that can be
gained and is not innate in any court system. State courts do not ignore
federal courts’ experience interpreting and applying federal law when
adjudicating statutory federal questions in their own forums.115 State-court
judges can, and do learn, from their federal counterparts.116 As Preis has
observed, “state courts routinely rely on federal precedent in making their
decisions, suggesting that their decisions will often comport with those of the
federal courts, and [] even when state courts judge in the comparatively
unconstrained field of state common law, the variability in their results
remains quite limited.”117 And, as always, the United States Supreme Court
still retains the final say if state courts deviate too far from constitutional or
federal law commands.118
Further, state courts will be conﬁned to an even narrower set of statutory
cases than appears on ﬁrst blush. The only cases that will ﬁnd a pulse in state
courts are those in which a plaintiﬀ does not allege, or a defendant cannot
prove when attempting to remove to federal court, more than a bare
procedural violation.119 This limits the potential reach of state-court decisions
on these federal questions.
Exclusive state-court jurisdiction will also not result in the level and
extent of disuniformity in law that Bennett predicts.120 Baked into this
premise is the assumption that federal law, as interpreted by federal courts, is
uniform (or at least arguably so). However, circuit splits pervade the federal
system. It would be a comically long footnote to capture the extent of circuit

Id.
Id. at 285-86.
Bennett, Paradox, supra note 13, at 1238-39 (“[F]ederal judges have more experience and
knowledge of . . . federal statutory claims—and are collectively better suited to ensure uniform
interpretation of federal laws—than their state counterparts.”); Redish & Muench, supra note 92, at
312 (“[S]tate court adjudication of certain federal causes of action might threaten the evolution of
federal rights because state judges often lack the expertise to deal with problems unique to federal
law.”); William Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement That a Case Arise “Directly” Under Federal
Law, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 890, 893, 906, 912 (1967) (discussing federal courts’ expertise in federal law
as a general matter).
115 Preis, Reassessing the Purposes, supra note 83, at 265 (“[S]tate courts rely more heavily on
federal precedent in resolving statutory federal questions than constitutional federal questions. In
these cases, state courts rely on federal precedent over seventy-ﬁve percent of the time.”).
116 Id.
117 Id. at 263.
118 See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). I discuss this in further detail below.
119 See supra Part I.
120 See supra Part II.
112
113
114
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splits.121 But, just for example, class certiﬁcation might be granted in one
circuit and not another based on whether or not an administratively feasible
mechanism exists to identify class members122; the equal terms provision of
the federal Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
would allow a synagogue to be built in a Florida city despite a local zoning
ordinance limiting them to residential areas but not in Long Branch, New
Jersey if it had adopted a similar zoning restriction123; and if a plaintiﬀ sued
the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims Act alleging wrongful
removal under immigration laws, the Ninth Circuit would exert jurisdiction
over that claim, but the Eighth Circuit would not.124
This is not to say that because disuniformity exists in the federal level,
potential exclusive state-court jurisdiction over certain questions of federal
law is unimportant. However, Bennett fails to grapple with the reality that
there is no measure of how much disuniformity is enough to destabilize
federal law. And because the background of federal law is already disjointed
it is unclear whether state courts will have much of an impact in adjudicating
federal question claims, especially because “in the federal and state systems,
where hundreds of thousands of federal questions are decided in civil cases
each year, a single errant decision by a state trial court does little to aﬀect the
overall uniformity of federal law.”125
Even if state courts were apt and would not disuniformly interpret federal
law, Bennett posits that this regime poses a threat to federalism: “[T]he
current state of the law threatens to assign a discrete class of federal claims
exclusively to state court, frustrating both the benefits of the federal
sovereign’s control over its own law and the possibility of cross-fertilization
in one go.”126 This critique persists, in his view, even though the United States
Supreme Court has the authority to review state supreme court decisions that
disrupt federal control of federal law.127 The United States Supreme Court’s
power to review state supreme court decisions is asymmetrical: losing
defendants in state court may bring a case before it, but plaintiﬀs who lose at
121 Preis reports that there were a total of 1017 new circuit splits from an analysis combining
the splits from 1998, 1999, 2002, and 2003. Preis, Reassessing the Purposes, supra note 83, at 261 tbl.1.
For an overview of circuit splits, see BLOOMBERG L., https://www.bloomberglaw.com/home
[https://perma.cc/2Y3P-QE7K] (enter “Circuit Splits Reported in U.S. Law Week” in the search bar).
122 Geoﬀrey C. Shaw, Note, Class Ascertainability, 124 YALE L.J. 2354, 2357, 2357 n.14 (2015)
(collecting cases and discussing the circuit split).
123 Compare Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1231 (11th Cir. 2004), with
The Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 268 (3d Cir. 2007).
124 Compare Arce v. United States, 899 F.3d 796, 799-801 (9th Cir. 2018), with Silva v. United
States, 866 F.3d 938, 942 (8th Cir. 2017).
125 Preis, Reassessing the Purposes, supra note 83, at 268.
126 Bennett, Paradox, supra note 13, at 1246.
127 Id. at 1248-49.
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the state supreme court level and lack federal standing cannot.128 This, then, in
Bennett’s view, is a suboptimal equilibrium of a sovereign’s “control” of its law.129
I am not as persuaded. First, while Bennett did not have the beneﬁt of
TransUnion, he suggests that this fallout from the standing cases was likely
unforeseen from the bench.130 However, Justice Thomas, in dissent, directly
addressed the “paradox” that the majority had created.131 Instead of charting
a diﬀerent path, the majority buckled down and allowed for state courts to
assume their constitutional role in adjudicating federal question cases.132
Second, the Constitution, as a baseline, presupposes that state courts
would have concurrent jurisdiction over federal questions, without any other
lower federal courts, and that the Supreme Court would have the ﬁnal power
to say what the law is.133 Over time, the Court has reaﬃrmed the principle
that state-court doors must generally be open to federal causes of action.134
And the Court has identiﬁed certain categories of gatekeeping mechanisms,
like standing, to eﬀectuate the Constitution’s other commands that limit its
jurisdiction.135 In essence, the equilibrium the Court has created is the result
of tradeoﬀs—the push and pull of constitutional commands. However, that
does not mean that it lacks control of federal law.
Third, it is undisputed that the Supreme Court retains the power to
review and decide questions of federal law stemming from state supreme
court decisions.136 I do not disagree that it is odd that defendants, but not
plaintiﬀs, who lose at the highest state-court level can petition the United
States Supreme Court for review. But this alone does not threaten federal
control of federal law as much as it presents an unfair reality for plaintiﬀs.137
Yet, this unfairness may itself be outweighed when a plaintiﬀ has their case
heard on their terms in state court and is not dragged by a defendant into
federal court through removal.
Relatedly, this asymmetry will not unacceptably skew the development of
federal law.138 Similar to the discussion involving uniformity above, no
baseline exists to measure what level of asymmetrical appellate review will
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1244.
TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2224 n.9 (2021) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
See generally id. (majority opinion).
See supra Section I.C; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
See supra Section I.C.
See supra Part II.
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 342 (1816).
Bennett, Paradox, supra note 13, at 1248.
Id. at 1249 (“The Court’s asymmetric jurisdiction thus ensures that its already-limited
supervisory power is also structurally biased against expansive readings of federal law, at least to the
extent that the Court is more likely to reserve than aﬃrm . . . .”).
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138

2022]

A Bug or a Feature?

165

inappropriately skew federal law or threaten federalism. It is diﬃcult to
understand how this asymmetry qualitatively or quantitatively diﬀers from
historical examples of asymmetric review. Prior to 1914, the Supreme Court
could only review a state supreme court case when it ruled against a federal
rights claim.139 The system survived that asymmetry and will likely survive
the asymmetry presented here, even though it cuts in the opposite direction.
This is because control of federal law does not stem from reviewing all “Cases
or Controversies.” Instead, it comes from reviewing only those decisions that
the Supreme Court deems a threat to the uniformity or supremacy of the
system, which was made clearer after the Court was granted discretion over
which cases to review.140 The Supreme Court still retains sovereign control of
federal law, and if the asymmetry begins to threaten that control, the Court
retains the power to overrule precedents to eliminate the asymmetry. Instead
of seeing the Supreme Court as sacriﬁcing sovereignty, it has invited, or at
least blessed, a new form of cooperative judicial federalism.141
CONCLUSION
This Essay seeks to temper some of the reservations regarding the
situation in which our system now ﬁnds itself: some state courts can exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over federal question claims. The impact of the Court’s
standing doctrine has not altered or destabilized our judicial system. The
preliminary data do not support the contention that there has been a huge
transfer of cases from federal court to state court or that a wide swath of
federal statutes is at risk of being trapped in state courts. And while
asymmetrical, if the Court seeks to assert its control of federal law, it has the
power to police the boundaries of state behavior when analyzing and
deciding questions of federal law.
The potential for, and now the reality of, certain state courts exercising
exclusive jurisdiction over federal question claims is a feature of our judicially
federalized system and not a bug. At bottom, it is an example of cooperative
judicial federalism that the Constitution endorses.

Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-87.
Saul Brenner, Granting Certiorari by the United States Supreme Court: An Overview of the Social
Science Studies, 92 LAW LIBR. J. 193, 193, 197-98 (2000) (describing variables associated with the
granting of certiorari).
141 For a discussion of cooperative federalism, see generally Frank R. Strong, Cooperative
Federalism, 23 IOWA L. REV. 459 (1938), Ernest A. Young, State Standing and Cooperative Federalism,
94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1893 (2019), and Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for
Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663 (2001).
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